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LAW STUDENT REPRESENTATION
OF INDIGENT CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS IN ILLINOIS
2
Gideon V. Wainwright1 and Douglas v. California,
and their
3
progeny, have broadened the application of the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel in a criminal case.4 The
Supreme Court decisions in Gideon, which made mandatory
upon the states that trial counsel be provided to indigent felony
defendants, and Douglas, which compelled the furnishing of
counsel on appeal, increased the demand for legal counsel by an
incalculable factor. 5

1 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The defendant was charged with breaking and
entering a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor, such offense being
a felony under Florida law. The defendant appeared in court without a
lawyer or the means to retain one and asked for court-appointed counsel.
The court refused on the ground it could only provide counsel in capital
cases. The defendant was therefore compelled to conduct his own defense.
2 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Two indigent defendants were convicted of thirteen felonies, including robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault
with intent to commit murder. Their request for counsel at the appellate
level was denied.
3 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
The petitioner was convicted
of "joyriding" and was placed on probation after pleading guilty on the
advice of his court-appointed counsel. Subsequently, the prosecution moved
to have his probation revoked on the ground he became involved in a burglary. At the revocation proceeding, the seventeen-year-old petitioner was
not afforded counsel and was sentenced to ten years in jail. The court stated
that Gideon compels the conclusion that "appointment of counsel for an
indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected." Id. at 134. See
also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967) ; and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), which hold
that since the police lineup procedure is considered a "critical stage" in the
criminal process, the accused must be afforded counsel as a matter of right
at such time, absent an intelligent waiver.
4 The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that:
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See
also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), wherein it is stated that "[t]he
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." Id. at 68-69.
5 For an extensive study of the effect of Gideon see Monaghan, Gideon's
Army: Student Soldiers, 45 B.U.L. REv. 445 (1965) and Anderson, Gideon:
A Challenging Opportunity for School and Bar, 9 VILL. L. REv. 619 (1964).
See also Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at
33, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), wherein it is stated that:
[W]hatever cost is to be placed upon the state courts, local communities,
and the bar must be borne as a result of the clear constitutional requirement that all indigent defendants in state criminal cases have a right to
be furnished with counsel.
See also Brief for State Government as Amicus Curiae at 23, Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which stated that:
The effect of obligatory representation in felony cases will concededly impose a difficult but not insurmountable burden on the bar.
The Legislatures in many states will have to act to set up an office of
the public defender or its equivalent . . .
The State, City and County Bar Associations in many instances
will have to bestir themselves. A vast expansion of the services of
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Some measure of this great need is evident from the situation in Illinois. In 1964 there were approximately 190,000 defendants charged with serious crimes in the City of Chicago
alone6 , of which fully one-half were unable to retain their own
counsel. 7 The Illinois Constitution complements this need by
providing that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel.
Similarly, legislative enactments promote a greater demand
for counsel in a number of proceedings. For example, the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure allows all persons arrested
or restrained of their liberty the right to consult with counsel. 9
Furthermore, the Code provides for counsel in all felonies before
the defendant has to plead his case, and that any indigent desiring representation is entitled to appointed counsel. 10 The right
to counsel also exists in mental health proceedings" and juvenile
charitable organizations such as Legal Aid seems plainly indicated.
Law schools of the nation can prove of immense help. The interstices
will have to be taken up by voluntary assignment and court appointment. (emphasis added).
6 CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE F.B.I., ANNUAL RETURN
OF OFFENSES KNOWN TO THE POLICE (1964).
These crimes were classified
by the Chicago Police as "Class I" crimes and included murder, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and larceny.
This listing excluded some felonies such as narcotics violations and sex offenses other than rape which are classified as "Class II" crimes. See also
D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT
(1968).
7 For a complete discussion of the rate of indigency see D. OAKS & W.
LEHMAN,
A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 82 (1968).
Nationwide, Mr. Lee Silverstein has estimated that approximately 300,000
persons are charged with felonies in the various states each year and over
one-half of these defendants cannot afford an attorney to defend them, L.
SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF
STATE COURTS 8 (1965).

8
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AMERICAN

ILL. CONST. art. II, §9 (1870).

9 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§103-3, 103-4 (1967).

Section 103-3(a) provides
that "[p]ersons who are arrested shall have the right to communicate with
an attorney. . . ."; while section 103-4 provides that:
Any person committed, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty for
any cause whatever and whether or not such person is charged with an
offense shall, except in cases of imminent danger of escape, be allowed
to consult with any licensed attorney at law of this State ....
(emphasis added).
The effect of the licensing requirement on the adoption of a law student
program will be discussed subsequently. See text at note 55 infra.
1o ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §113-3 (1967), which provides that:
(a)
Every person charged with an offense shall be allowed counsel
before pleading to charge. ...
(b)
In all cases, except where the penalty is a fine only, if the
court determines that the defendant is indigent and desires counsel, the
Public Defender shall be appointed as counsel. . . . [T]he court may
appoint as counsel a licensed attorney at law of this State. . ..
"ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91/ , §9-4 (1967), which provides that:
At any hearing under this Act, the court shall inform the person asserted to be mentally retarded or to be in need of mental treatment of
his right to counsel and ask if he desires counsel of his choice to be
summoned or counsel to be appointed by the court. . ..
1. If the court determines that the person asserted to be mentally
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cases, 12 while in post-conviction hearings the right depends upon
the defendant's choice. 13
Referring to this expressed public policy, the Illinois Supreme Court recently stated that "[i]t has long been a major
goal of our entire judicial system to see that all persons charged
with a crime 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice.
S. 1,4

Thus, the legislators and the courts have contributed

to the great demand for legal representation that weighs heavily
upon available counsel.
One method of solving the quantitative demand that all
felony defendants obtain competent counsel would be the establishment of a program utilizing law school students from the
seven law schools in Illinois 15 to represent indigent defendants.
In addition to furnishing effective representation, such a program would provide invaluable professional training to Illinois
law students. 6
Before a judgment can be made as to whether Illinois
should adopt a law student program to represent indigent
criminal defendants, several questions must first be answered:
What is the nature and extent of student representation in existing programs? Do law students have the competency to
represent indigents in court?, Can such a program satisfy
constitutional provisions for safeguarding the accused's rights?
Would such a program constitute the unauthorized practice of
law; and, if so, how can this problem be obviated? Finally,
must a student participation program be effectuated by specific
legislation or can the Illinois Supreme Court use the rule-making
power to establish such a program?
retarded or to be in need of mental treatment is indigent, the court
shall appoint as counsel the Public Defender, if available.
2. If the Public Defender is not available, the court shall appoint
as counsel an attorney at law licensed by this State.
12

ILL.

REV. STAT. ch. 37, §701-20 (1967), which provides that:

[T]he minor who is the subject of the proceeding . . . although proceedings under this Act are not intended to be adversary in character,
[has] the right to be represented by counsel. At the request of any
party financially unable to employ counsel, the court shall appoint counsel.
13 ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 38, §122-4 (1967), which provides that:

If the petitioner is without counsel and alleges that he is without means
to procure counsel, he shall state whether or not he wishes counsel to be
appointed to represent him. If appointment of counsel is so requested,
the court shall appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no
means to procure counsel.
14 People v. Watson 36 Ill.2d 228, 232, 221 N.E.2d 645, 648 (1966).
15 Chicago-Kent College of Law, DePaul University College of Law, John
Marshall Law School, Loyola University School of Law, Northwestern University School of Law, University of Chicago Law School, and the University
of Illinois College of Law.
16 See, e.g., Anderson, Gideon: A Challenging Opportunity for School
and Bar, 9 VILL. L. REV. 619 (1964)'
See also Brief in Support of the
Adoption of Legal Aid Clinic Rule at Part III, Mich. Gen. Ct. Rule 921
(1965).
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PROGRAMS IN EFFECT
With regard to the initial inquiry, there are two types of
programs involving law student representation of indigent defendants, distinguishable by the nature of the law student's
participation. The first provides for the student's appearance
in court, while the second type calls for out-of-court assistance
to defense counsel. In Illinois, several programs of the latter
variety are in operation and will be discussed after a consideration of in-court representation programs of other states.
Currently, there are several states which permit law students to appear in court to aid indigents in some capacity.17
Minnesota, by adoption of a Supreme Court Rule on June 27,
1967, was one of the more recent states to institute a program
that provides for representation by senior law students as
follows:
Any senior law student in a law school in this state accredited
by The American Bar Association, may, with the written approval
of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, interview, advise, negotiate,
and appear in any municipal or trial court on behalf of any indigent person accused of crime, or on behalf of the prosecution,
or may represent any indigent person in a civil action; provided,
however, that the conduct of the case is under the supervision of
a member of the State Bar of Minnesota.
Before any student shall be eligible to appear in court for or
on behalf of any indigent person accused of crime, or on behalf
of the prosecution, or represent any indigent person in a civil
action, the Dean of the accredited law school of which he is a student shall file with the Supreme Court a list of names of the
enrolled students who have been selected by the faculty to participate in the program. Upon written approval by the Supreme
Court of a student so certified, and the filing of such written
approval, or a certified copy thereof, with the district court wherein
the law school is located, such approved student shall be, and is
hereby, authorized to appear in any court of the State of Minnesota when under the supervision of a member of the State Bar of
Minnesota on behalf of such indigent persons accused of crime,
or on behalf of the prosecution, or to represent indigent persons in
any civil action as may be assigned to them. The expression
'supervision' shall be construed to require the personal attendance
of the supervising member of the bar during any trial, plea and
sentence, or any other critical stage of any proceeding in or out
17 COLO. REV. STAT. §12-1-19 (1963); CONN. PRAc. BBK. ch. 45, §894
(1963); FLA. STAT. ANN., RULES CRIM. PROC. rule 1.860 (1968); MASS.

JUD. CT. R. 11 (1958); MICH. STAT. ANN., SUP. CT. R. 921 (Cum. Supp.
1968); MINN. STAT. ANN., CT. RULES Vol. 27A (Cum. Supp. 1959-1967);

MONT. REV. CODE §93-6704 (1947); RULES GOVERNING NEW JERSEY

COURTS,

SuP. CT. R. 1:12-8A (1968); NEW MEX. STAT. ANN., §18-1-26 (Supp. 1967);

N.Y. CON. LAWS §478 (McKinney 1968); Order Authorizing Limited License
to Practice Law to Certain Qualified Law School Applicants and Adopting
Rules Governing the Granting of Limited License to Practice Law to Qualified Law School Applicants, 38 OKLA. B.A.J. 1242 (1967); PENN. RULES OF
COURT rule 121/2 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN., SUP. CT. R. 37, §21 (1956);
WYO. STAT. ANN., RULES FOR BAR Assoc. rule 18 (1957).
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of the court room. In all events representation afforded pursuant
to this rule must comply with minimal standards required by the
State and Federal Constitutions.
The written approval of each student by the Supreme Court
of Minnesota shall remain in force and effect for a period of
twelve months from the date of filing unless withdrawn earlier.' 8
Essentially, after selection by the law school and upon approval
of the supreme court, the senior law student participates in
court proceedings under the supervision of an attorney. The
defendant's rights are protected by the requirement that representation under that rule shall comply with constitutional due
process.
Similar to the Minnesota practice, Florida's senior law
students are permitted to represent indigents by court rule. 19
This provision has been construed in Dixon v. State, 2 0 where a
public defender's request that two law students be allowed to
participate in arguing defendant's motion for a new trial was
refused by the trial court. The appellate court held there was
no error in declining to allow the students to assist in arguing
the motion because they had not participated during the trial. 21
The court implicitly recognized the status of law students as
counsel in stating that "it was within the trial Court's discretion to have heard . . . [the students'] argument on the new
22
trial motion . . .
Tennessee's court rule permits senior law students from
accredited Tennessee law schools to represent indigents with the
significant exception that the physical presence of a supervising
attorney is not required, 2 contrary to the established practice
in Florida and Minnesota. Whether the supervising attorney's
presence is required appears to be the difference amongst the
various state rules and acts which allow students to represent
indigents in court.
Most states follow the Tennessee rule
24
which does not require in-court supervision of the law student.
The second type of program exists in Illinois, where law
students render out-of-court assistance to attorneys representing
indigent defendants. The largest program of this nature is
the Federal Defender Program for the Northern District of
Illinois, which is derived from the Criminal Justice Act of
18

MINN. STAT. ANN., CT. RULES Vol. 27A (Cum. Supp. 1959-1967).

19 FLA. STAT. ANN., RULES CRIM. PROC.

rule 1.860 (1968).

20 191 So.2d 94 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
21 Id. at 96.
22 Id. at 97.
23 TENN. CODE ANN., Sup. Ct. R. 37, §21 (1956), stating that "[i]mmediate supervision as used in this ORDER does not necessarily mean physical
presence of the supervising attorney but shall always mean under the direction of such licensed attorney."
24 For a comparison of the programs in the various states see Appendix
I infra.
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1964.25 The six law schools in Chicago have formed a student
training and assistance program in which two-man student
teams report to the federal court and work under the supervision
of a private attorney. 26 A similar program on the state level is
the State Law Student Internship Program of the Circuit Court
of Cook County. This recent program utilizes law students
chosen from the six Chicago law schools to work under the
direction of a judge in various divisions of the Circuit Court.
The student assists the court with research and is present as
an observer during judge-lawyer conferences. This program is
under the direction of the Chief Judge and is administered
by his Chief Administrative Assistant.27 Students also serve at
the Chicago Legal Aid Bureau in various out-of-court activities
28
and in several local school programs.
Once the program is established, the next question to be
determined is whether law students have the capability of rendering effective assistance to indigents.
Do

STUDENTS HAVE THE NECESSARY TRAINING AND ABILITY?

In 1953, Professor Harno of the University of Illinois favorably characterized the state of legal education in the United

States, stating:
Progress

in legal education

.

.

.

has been brought

about

18 U.S.C. §3006A (1964), which provides:
(a)
Choice of plan. - Each United States district court, with the
approval of the judicial council of the circuit, shall place in operation
throughout the district a plan for furnishing representation for defendants charged with felonies or misdemeanors ... who are financially
unable to obtain an adequate defense ...
26 O'Brien, Implementing Justice: The National Defender Project, 1
VAL. UNIV. L. R. 320, 337 (1967).
For a complete discussion of the
Federal Defender Program for the Northern District of Illinois, see MacCarthy, "Interns at Law" Chicago's Novel Contribution to Legal Education,
49 CHI. BAR REC. 46 (1967).
27 The information on this Law Student Internship Program was obtained from Mr. Robert G. Johnston, a faculty member of The John Marshall
Law School who is in charge of the program at this school. The program
is currently under the direction of Chief Judge John S. Boyle and is administered by Benjamin S. Mackoff, Chief Administrative Assistant.
28 Information was obtained by correspondence
with the various law
schools in Illinois with regard to the programs available in these schools
permitting student participation. Dean John Ritchie of the Northwestern
University School of Law stated that his students work at the Chicago Legal
Aid Bureau, the Neighborhood Law Office on the Near North Side, in the
Law Student Civil Rights Research Committee's undertakings, and in the
office of the Public Defender of Chicago. Mr. Phillip H. Ginsberg, Director
of the Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, said that about sixty students at the University of Chicago Law School constitute the Mandel Legal Aid Association,
where they are involved in criminal trials and appeals, landlord-tenant relationships, consumer credit, and economic development for the indigent. Professor Robert W. Brown of the University of Illinois College of Law stated
that the students work in conjunction with the local county public defender
as his investigatory branch, provide research assistance for the local public
defender, and handle some post-conviction appeal research. The University
of Illinois students also work for the local OEO Legal Services Agency.
These letters are on file in the office of The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure.
25
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through the establishment of certain quantitative standards through settingup requirements involving specified periods of
prelaw and law study, minimum physical facilities for law schools,
the number of books in law school libraries, the minimum num-

ber of teachers on law-school staffs. ... .2
Another commentator recently stated that American law
schools emphasize the practical considerations of legal advocacy
rather than the historical or philosophical aspects of the law. 0
Many of today's law schools are vocationally oriented, 1 thereby
enabling the student to obtain a working knowledge of the
various fields of law, as well as learning the numerous skills an
attorney must possess to understand the ubiquitous complexities
in the present legal environment.
For example, the use of "practice courts" in law schools
allows the prospective lawyer some insight into the actual
A. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 164 (1953).
30 Samad, ReappraisingAmerican Legal Education Through a Compara29

tive Study, 13 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 375 (1964), where, in discussing American legal education, the author stated that the following are commonly
found in American law schools:
[A] law degree is prerequisite to taking the bar examination, the control
exercised by legal accrediting agencies, the stress in the curriculum on
bar examination subjects, the stress of learning law in the context of
litigation through the case method, rather than upon the study of law
historically and institutionally through the lecture method, and the
fact that the law school curriculum comprises mainly legal as opposed
to cultural subject matter.
Id. at 379.
31 The factors which compose this vocational characterization have been
stated as follows:
The curricula of the American law schools is [sic] vocationally oriented,
so that the student gains information in the basic substantive and adjective principles of the law; develops insights into legal institutions,
legal method, and professional responsibility; develops dialectical skills
in fact discrimination, case and issue analysis, legal synthesis, and issue
disposition; gains technical skill in legal research and writing, advocacy and draftsmanship; and learns integration of skills in terms of
legal planning, legal counselling, and representation of legal interests in
legislative, negotiatory, and adjudicative proceedings.
Id. at 385-86. See also Brief in Support of the Adoption of Legal Clinic
Rule at Appendix A, Mich. Gen. Ct. Rule 921 (1965), wherein A. H. Wheeler,
Dr.Ph., Chairman of the Washtenaw County Citizens Committee for Economic Opportunity, gave the following reasons for permitting law students
to represent indigents:
a)
our personal knowledge of their dedication and enthusiasm to
the concept and purposes of the Clinic
b) their superior preparation, qualifications and access to relevant
information compared to the efforts of those of us, without any
legal training, who now counsel and assist
c) the likelihood that much of their work will be to counsel, to
refer people to proper resources in the community and to conduct a variety of the negotiations that may secure satisfactory
solutions without the necessity of going into Court
d)
the enthusiastic support that the legal community has given to
similar clinics in other parts of the nation
e) the anticipated creation of an Advisory Board composed in
large measure of the people to be served and representatives
of organizations that now assist them ...
See also LEAA Dissemination Document (Grant 085) - Harvard Student
District Attorney Project - A Clinical Experience in Prosecutionof Minor
Criminal Cases by Senior Law Students, which illustrates the ability of students in prosecuting minor criminal cases.
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handling of a case. Practical experience is gained by affording
the student an opportunity to correlate his knowledge of procedural and substantive courses while acting as counsel in a
hypothetical case, from the initiation of a suit through postjudgment proceedings. By interviewing witnesses, filing pleadings, and appearing in a trial setting, the student develops
necessary skills which would enable him to render effective
32
assistance to the indigent accused.

Furthermore, in many law schools, a student develops legal
research skills through required courses and assigned research
projects.3 3 Similarly, those students who receive the opportunity to participate with law school journals are well versed in

the techniques of legal research and writing. Thus, the students'
knowledge of the techniques of research further complements
their capability for representing indigents.

Justice Tom C. Clark has acknowledged the law student's
capability by stating that " [t] oday, the average graduate's knowledge of substantive law is really amazing and a goodly per cent
reach brilliance. ' 34 Confidence in the ability of law students
to represent indigents was expressed by way of argument in
Gideon, with such statements as:
A voluntary defender system may use salaried investigators or it

may be aided by volunteers from private law offices or local law
schools. Such a system is typical of the large urban centers in
32 Stevens, Legal Education for Practice: What the Law Schools Can
Do and Are Doing, 40 A.B.A.J. 211 (1954), where the author acknowledges
that:
A few law schools operate a practice court, using actual live controversies presided over by local judges. Thus the students get practical experience and training in dealing with real issues, contacting and
conferring with real parties and witnesses, preparing and filing actual
pleadings, and examining and cross-examining persons with personal
knowledge of the actual events which are the subject matter of the
trial. 'Practice Court serves the function of a legal laboratory where,
under expert supervision and in a highly realistic setting, the students
are given an opportunity to put into practice the knowledge which
they have acquired during the course.'
Id. at 213. See also Brief in Support of the Adoption of Legal Aid Clinic
Rule at Part III, at 7, Mich. Gen. Ct. Rule 921 (1965), stating that a two
year program would give the student the necessary knowledge and experience:
[T]he clinic will be established as a two year operation so that a student
will normally have to participate in his second year to be permitted to
engage in the clinic as a third year law student. Under these circumstances he will have an opportunity to sit in court as a critical observer;
he will have an opportunity to observe a number of negotiations and
to observe the interviewing and advising of clients. He will, therefore,
have some substantial experience in the limited area in which the legal
aid33clinic will operate.
Legal Education for Practice: What the Law Schools Can Do and
Are Doing, supra note 33, at 213.
34 Clark, Some Thoughts on Legal Education, 12 AM. UNiv. L. REV.
125, 128 (1963), where the author emphasized that there is a need for some
ractical experience for the law student which may be satisfied by allowing
w student participation in trial courts, under the supervision of an experienced attorney.
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Its cost to the community and the bar is minimal. 35

The State, City and County Bar Associations in many instances will have to bestir themselves. A vast expansion of the
services of charitable organizations such as Legal Aid seems

plainly indicated.
mense help. . ..

Law schools of the nation can prove of im311

Programs already adopted in other jurisdictions have demonstrated that students possess the capacity to be responsible
representatives.3 7
In arguing for the adoption of a student
representative program in Michigan, one law school dean has
said:
[A] properly supervised law student can prepare and present a defense which will far exceed the minimum standards of competence
which have
been established and applied in the federal and state
38
courts.
As a result of the above confidence attributed to the ability of
law students, the American Bar Association is presently considering the adoption of a model rule to permit law student
representation of indigents in both civil and criminal cases,
as well as before administrative tribunals.39
Thus, it is clear that senior law students possess the
qualifications necessary for providing indigents with adequate
and effective counsel due to their exposure to a broader procedural and substantive curricula in today's law schools and the
practical experience gained in "practice courts."
However,
the students' ability as an advocate must be justified with regard to the requirements of constitutional due process.
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."' 4 Thirty
years ago, in Johnson v. Zerbst,4 1 the Court held that the sixth
amendment imposed a duty upon the federal government to
provide legal representation where the defendants appeared
without counsel because of indigency. 42 This principle has
35 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 35,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
36 Brief for State Government as Amicus Curiae at 24, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (emphasis added).
37 See Brief in Support of the Adoption of Legal Aid Clinic Rule at
Part II, Mich. Gen. Ct. Rule 921 (1965).
38 Id. at Part IV, at 16.
See also Chicago Sun-Times, May 3, 1968, at
66, col. 1, where Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter V. Schaeffer, a proponent for allowing third-year law students to represent indigents in minor
criminal and civil cases, was quoted as saying that "the average law student is better prepared today than when he went to school."
39 AM. BAR Ngws, Vol. 13, No. 12, at 6 (December, 1968).
40 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
41304 U.S. 458 (1938).
42 The Zerbst Court established that the denial of legal representation
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become obligatory upon the states through Gideon.45
In considering indigents' convictions, the federal and state
courts have been ardent in their pronouncement that the right to
counsel is a fundamental requisite of procedural due process
rather than a vacuous formality. For example, in Brubaker v.
Dickson,4 4 an indigent's conviction of first-degree murder was reversed because his court-assigned counsel failed to conduct an
investigation or to present available evidence to show that the
accused did not possess the specific intent to commit the crime.
The court of appeals commented upon the quality of counsel
demanded by constitutional safeguards, stating that:
[T]he due process clause 'prohibits the conviction and incarceration
of one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental
ideas of fairness and right.'
. . [However] . . . the constitutional requirement . . . is
one of substance, not of form ...
• . . Due process does not require 'errorless counsel, . . . but
likely to render and rendering reasonably effeccounsel reasonably
45
tive assistance.'
Similarly, in Powell v. Alabama46 in which several Negroes were
indicted and tried for rape without assistance of counsel, the
United States Supreme Court stated that:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because
of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy or the like, it is the duty
of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him
as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is
not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such
circumstances as to preclude the4 7giving of effective aid in the
preparation and trial of the case.
Thus, the Court established that the duty to provide for the assistance of counsel means effective counsel and not necessarily
48
experienced counsel.
In People v. Cox, 49 the Illinois Supreme Court extensively
considered the meaning of assistance of counsel in reviewing a
fourteen-year-old boy's murder conviction. The defendant contended that he was deprived of the assistance of counsel because
would constitute grounds for habeas corpus relief, stating that:
If the accused . . . is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth
Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and
sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.
Id. at 468.
43372 U.S. 335 (1963). See text at note 1 supra.
44310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962).
45 Id. at 37 (emphasis added). See also Constitutional Law - Due
Process - Denial of Effective Aid of Counsel Violates Fourteenth Amendment - Brubaker v. Dickson (United States Circuit Court of Appeals, 9th
Cir., 1962), 27 ALBANY L. REv. 291 (1963).
46287 U.S. 45 (1932).

47M. at 71.
48 Id.
49 12

Ill.2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957).
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his "attorney" had not been licensed to practice law in Illinois.
Despite the fact that the "attorney's" lack of qualifications was
discovered five years after conviction, the Illinois Supreme Court
stated:
A violation of due process does not result . . . from the single
circumstance, unaided by other facts, that the counsel of a defendant's choice is later proved to be unlicensed to practice law
before the court in which the trial occurred. 50

The Illinois Supreme Court then discussed the defendant's constitutional right to counsel as measured by the attorney's ability
to render effective assistance, stating:
[T]he right to counsel is not a mere formality, but contemplates
that only qualified persons will be permitted to defend in a court
of justice the life or liberty of a person charged with a crime.
This does not mean . . . that an accused who has been represented by one other than a licensed attorney may claim, ipso facto,
51
that he has been deprived of his constitutional rights.

The Illinois Supreme Court then concluded that:
[T]he test of due process is not whether the defendant had an
attorney, licensed or unlicensed, but whether under all the circumstances of the case, his conviction was obtained in such a manner as to be offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of what
52
is fair and what is right.

In light of the above, the constitutional issue regarding the
adequacy of student representation evolves into whether a senior
law student would be capable of rendering reasonably effective
assistance of counsel? The Constitution has been interpreted as
requiring that a defense attorney's qualifications and advocacy
comport with common ideas of fairness, rightness, and justice.
A senior law student would satisfy these due process requirements, particularly if the student has proven his capabilities in
law school and remains subject to an experienced practitioner's
supervision. Thus, it is demonstrable that senior law students
can satisfy the constitutional safeguards for the effective repre5o Id. at 272, 146 N.E.2d at 23.
51 Id. at 269-70, 146 N.E.2d at 22 (emphasis added).
52 Id. at 271, 146 N.E.2d at 23.
See also State v. Johnson, 64 S.D.
162, 265 N.W. 599 (1936), where the Supreme Court of South Dakota stated
that the fact that defendant's attorney had been disbarred prior to the
date of trial and had never been reinstated "would not [alone] entitle defendant to a new trial, unless it appeared that his rights had been prejudiced in some manner by the deception of his counsel." Id. at 165, 265
N.W. at 600. Further, in discussing the test of due process, it has been
stated in Annot., 68 A.L.R. 2d 1141, 1146 (1959) that:
It has been expressly recognized by courts in several jurisdictions
that the mere fact that counsel representing the accused may have been
unlicensed, or not a member of the bar of the state where the trial was
held, is insufficient to show that the accused was denied due process of
law; in addition, the accused must demonstrate that the trial was unfair because he was prejudiced by the actual representation accorded
him by the unlicensed counsel, or that the general combination of circumstances was such that he was denied a fair trial.
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sentation of criminal defendants. 53 It remains to be considered
whether representation by law students would constitute the improper practice of law.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

Apart from the questions of the capability of representation by senior law students and the constitutional adequacy of
such representation, the problem remains as to whether such
representation would constitute the unauthorized practice of law
according to the present Illinois statute,14 rules of court,55 and
decided cases. 56

The Illinois Attorney and Counselors Act provides that
"[n]o person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or
counselor at law within this State without having previously obtained a license for that purpose from the Supreme Court of
this State. ' 57 The underlying purpose of this license requirement
53 See Brief in Support of the Adoption of Legal Aid Clinic Rule at
14, Mich. Gen. Ct. Rule 921 (1965), wherein it is stated that:
Were the United States Supreme Court . . . called upon to determine the constitutional validity of law student representation, . . . [it]
would recognize that the defendant had received some counsel and
would focus upon the question of competence: Was that counsel suf-

ficiently competent to meet the constitutional requirement?

54 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, §1 (1967).
By virtue of this statute, only
those persons licensed as attorneys may practice in Illinois. See also ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §32-5 (1967), which provides that:
A person who falsely represents himself to be an attorney authorized to practice law . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned in a penal
institution other than the penitentiary ... or both.
55 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §701 (1967), which states that only qualified
licensed attorneys may practice law in Illinois.
56 See, e.g., People v. Alexander, 53 Ill. App. 2d 299, 202 N.E.2d 841
(1964), which held that the appearance of law clerks before the bar would
constitute, under certain circumstances, the unauthorized practice of law.
With regard to the practice of law by law clerks, their activities have
been regulated and limited to:
[W]ork of a preparatory nature, such as research, investigation of
details, assemblage of data, and like work that will enable the attorneyemployer to carry a given matter to a conclusion through his own
examination, approval, or additional effort. The activities of a law
clerk do not constitute the practice of law so long as they are thus
limited. However, the law clerk does engage in law practice when he
handles uncontested probate matters, gives oral opinions on abstracts
of title, or prepares wills, leases mortgages, bills of sale, or contracts
without supervision from his employer.
7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law §88 (1963).
See also People v. Munson, 319 Ill. 596, 150 N.E. 280 (1926), in which
the State's Attorney who conducted the examination of witnesses before a
grand jury indictment was not a licensed attorney, the court stated:
The statute prohibiting the practice of law by one not licensed is
to be observed in fact as well as in theory, and the fact that there may
be associated in the trial of the case other persons actually licensed to
practice law in nowise validates the participation of one not so authorized.
Id. at 605, 150 N.E. at 283.
57 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, §1 (1967).
Furthermore, all states have established, by means of statute and/or court rule, that no person, other than
a licensed attorney, may practice law. See, e.g., 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client
§§5, 16 (1937).
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is twofold: to protect the integrity of the legal profession 58 and
to provide the public with reasonably effective assistance of
counsel. The Illinois Supreme Court has considered the latter
purpose as the primary reason for regulating the legal profession:
A license granted by this court to practice is a guarantee that,
so far as this court is advised, the person holding such license is a
fit and proper person to assume the responsibilities, to enjoy and
safe-keep the confidence of others, and to aid and assist them in
the care and management of their legal business and affairs. 59
Concomitantly, the Illinois Supreme Court has expressed the
following definition of the practice of law:
The courts are in accord on the proposition that where one
appears in a court representing one of the parties to the litigation,
counsels and advises with such party in reference to his rights in
the suit, selects the kind of pleading and drafts it, and assumes
general control of the action in the court, he is engaged in the
practice of law. ... [Als to what constitutes practicing of law
[it] is not limited to practice in courts of record but may include
the giving of advice, counseling, drafting of legal documents and the
participation in transactions which are outside the scope of the
actual litigation of a cause in the courts. 60

The above judicial attitude has been applied to only one case

dealing with the practice of law by a law student. In People V.

Alexander," the law student defendant was found guilty of contempt of court for the unauthorized practice of law. The defendant had collaborated with an attorney in preparing and
presenting a motion that the court enter an order spreading

58 The "integrity" aspect for the requirement of the licensing of attorneys is based on economy and as an aid to the courts. See, e.g., Heiskell v.
Mozie, 82 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1936), commenting that the rule allowing
only licensed attorneys to practice law:
[A]rises out of the necessity, in the proper administration of justice,
of having legal proceedings carried on according to the rules of law
and the practice of courts and by those charged with the responsibility
of legal knowledge and professional duty.
Id. at 863. See also 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §7 (1937).
59 People v. Czarnecki, 268 Ill. 278, 294, 109 N.E. 14, 20 (1915). See also
In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951), where the same intention was
stated:
[Tlhe underlying purpose of regulating the practice of law is not so
much to protect the public from having to pay fees to unqualified legal
advisors as it is to protect the public against the often drastic and
far-reaching consequences of their inexpert legal advice.
Id. at6 339,
85 A.2d
at 514.
People
ex rel.
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 288, 77
N.E.2d 693, 696, cert. denied, 334 U.S. 833 (1948). See also People ex rel.
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937), which
denoted the practice of law with regard to the nature of the activity, stating
that:
It is immaterial whether the acts which constitute the practice of law
are done in an office, before a court or before an administrative body.
The character of the act done, and not the place where it is committed,
is the factor which is decisive of whether it constitutes the practice of
law.
Id. at 357, 8 N.E.2d at 947. See generally 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law
§73 (1963).
61 53 I1. App. 2d 299, 202 N.E.2d 841 (1964).
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mistrial of record, 62 pursuant to the judge's request. Significantly, with regard to the aspect of the practice of law by the
student clerk, the Illinois court said:
[C]lerks should not be permitted to make motions or participate
in other proceedings which can be considered as 'managing' the
litigation [but] clerks may make such motions
.. .without being
63
guilty of the unauthorized practice of law.
The court thus recognized that the student's personal appear4
ance in a courtroom was not a per se violation.
The Illinois Supreme Court has been emphatic in characterizing the admission to practice law as a judicial prerogative,
rather than a matter for the legislature. In People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Goodman,65 the Illinois Supreme Court
asserted its right to determine the qualifications for admission
to the practice of law, stating, "[t]he power is inherent in this
court to prescribe regulations for the study of law and the
admission of applicants for the practice of that profession."66
Thus, the court views itself as the sole authority for granting
admission to the bar.67
Hence, the statute prescribes that only licensed attorneys be
allowed to represent clients, but the underlying purpose of that
statute and the definition given to the practice of law is expressed
in terms of the degree of effective assistance which may be
rendered.
Due to the license requirement, the appearance of
third-year law students as representatives of indigents, even
under the supervision of a licensed attorney, would be the unauthorized practice of law.6 8 However, if senior law students
have demonstrated their ability to render effective representation, then the purpose of the licensing provision would be satisfied. Therefore, since the court regulates the practice of law,
the problem of unauthorized practice by law students would be
solved by judicial exception to allow third-year law students to
represent indigents.6 9
62 The court stated that an order spreading mistrial of record is "[ain
order of court reciting the verdict of a jury or setting out its failure to
agree on a verdict .

. .

."

Id. at 301, 202 N.E.2d at 842.

63 Id. at 303, 202 N.E.2d at 843.
See also Annot., 13 A.L.R. 3d 1137
(1967) for a discussion of the activities of law clerks with regard to the
illegal
6 practice of law.
4See also Dixon v. State, 191 So.2d 94 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
65366 Ill.
346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728.
66 Id. at 349-50, 8 N.E.2d at 944.
The court further stated that "[t]he
power to regulate and define the practice of law is a prerogative of the
judicial department as one of the three divisions of the government created
by article 3 of our constitution." Id. at 349, 8 N.E.2d at 944.
67 See also In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 82-83, 92, 54 N.E. 646, 648, 651 (1899).
68 See Nolan, Special Statement of the Committee on Character and
Fitness of the Chicago Bar Association, 48 Ciii. BAR Ruc. 55 (1967).
69 See text at note 17 supra for a discussion of such programs in effect
in other jurisdictions.
In addition, an analogy can be drawn to the practice employed by medical schools. Third and fourth-year medical students spend a significant
portion of their time in hospital clinics under the supervision of a licensed
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CONCLUSION

It is suggested that the adoption of a rule allowing law student participation under licensed supervision will alleviate the
urgent, demonstrated need for in-court representation of indigent
defendants. In theory, law students have the necessary training
and ability to provide indigent defendants with effective assis-

tance of counsel as is required under the sixth and fourteenth
amendments of the Constitution. As previously demonstrated,
the only practical barrier is the licensing requirement, which
would be satisfied under a judicial exception for qualified law

students because the judiciary would control those students who
would participate in court by approval of the recommended students from the various law schools. Thus, such a judicial exception should be granted. It is urged, therefore, that the Illinois
Supreme Court adopt the rule proposed by the Chicago Bar
Association7 0 permitting senior law students to represent criminal
indigents in Illinois courts.*
David W. Rosenberg

physician, and this practice has not been challenged as the unauthorized
practice of medicine, even though the Illinois statute provides that only
licensed physicians may practice medicine (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, §2
(1967)).
This is, in fact, where the future doctor gains his practical experience. Furthermore, senior medical students at the Chicago Maternity
Center assist in delivering babies in the homes of those who cannot afford
hospital facilities. Normally, there are only two medical students and one
nurse comprising a team. Additional assistance is requested only when the
need arises. Medical students, therefore, in hospitals and clinics are performing a valuable function to society. Thus, since medical students are
being permitted to work in clinics while under the supervision of licensed
physicians, this would be an analogous situation with regard to permitting
law students to represent indigents while under the supervision of a licensed
attorney.
70 See Appendix II infr'a.
*Editor's Note: During the preparation of this article for publication
the Illinois Supreme Court adopted Rule 711, entitled Representation by
Supervised Senior Law Students, effective as of May 27, 1969. This rule
deals with many of the problems discussed in the foregoing comment. However, the beneficial effect of this enactment is limited since the senior law
student's participation can be accomplished only through employment in
approved programs or state legal departments, i.e. the Public Defender. It

is submitted that the indigent defendant's need ?or counsel requires more
extensive participation than that provided by Rule 711. Thus, senior law
students should be allowed to represent clients while employed in private
law firms with the same supervision as required in all criminal proceedings.
This conclusion follows from the fact that the need for representation necessitates involvement of all segments of the Bar.
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APPENDIX II
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
RULE
REPRESENTATION BY SUPERVISED LAW STUDENTS
1. Purpose:
It is the responsibility of a judicial system to provide adequate legal
services for all persons, regardless of their ability to pay. The discharge
of this obligation and the training of law students may be promoted by the
efforts of qualified law students acting under adequate supervision by members of the Bar.
2. Eligibility:
The activities by law students authorized by this rule may be undertaken only by law students who satisfy all of the requirements set forth
below. For the purposes stated herein, an "approved law school" shall
mean a law school approved by the Board of Law Examiners pursuant to
Rule 58 of the Supreme Court of Illinois. Law students to be eligible:
A. Shall have received credit, from an approved law school, for work
representing at least two-thirds of the total hourly credits required
for graduation.
B. Shall be certified to the Supreme Court of Illinois by the Deans of
their respective law schools as having satisfied to the Supreme
Court of Illinois the foregoing'credit requirement, as being students in good academic standing, and as being eligible under the
school's criteria to undertake the activities authorized herein.
C. Shall undertake the activities authorized herein only in the course
of their work for one of the following organizations or programs:
(i)
A legal aid bureau, organization or clinic chartered by the
State of Illinois br established by an approved law school located in Illinois.
(ii)
An office of the public defender; or
(iii)
A program (a) to provide representation for indigent parties
in courts of review and (b) approved by the Chief Justice of
the Illinois Supreme Court, which approval has not been
withdrawn.
(iv) A program (a) to provide representation to indigent parties
in the trial courts and (b) approved by the Chief Judge of the
Circuit Court in which such representation is to be provided,
which approval has not been withdrawn.
3. Activities and Practice:
An eligible student shall be licensed to engage, under the general supervision of a duly enrolled member of the Bar of Illinois, in the following activities, subject to the limitations herein expressed:
A. To interview and counsel with clients.
B. To negotiate generally in :the settlement of claims and to engage in
the preparation and drafting of legal instruments.
C. To appear in the trial courts of this State in criminal and civil
matters.
(i)
In all civil cases, appearances and pleadings shall be signed
by the supervising member of the Bar, but his presence while
the case is being presented in court shall not be required.
(ii)
In all criminal cases involving a charge of an offense where
the penalty is a fine only, eligible students may prepare all
documents to be filed in such cases, but such documents shall
be signed by the supervising member of the Bar, and eligible
students may conduct all pre-trial, trial and post-trial proceedings.
(iii) In all criminal cases involving a charge of an offense subject
to the penalty of imprisonment, all documents filed may be
prepared by eligible students but shall be signed by the supervising member of the Bar. Eligible students may participate
in pretrial, trial and post-trial proceedings in such cases only
in the presence of the supervising member of the Bar. The
restrictions set forth in this subparagraph (3 (C) (iii) shall
extend to a post-conviction proceeding challenging a sentence
of imprisonment and to a proceeding, such as an action for
contempt, which may be designated as a "civil case," for some
purposes, but which may result in a sentence of imprisonment.
(iv) Documents filed in the trial courts may set forth the names of
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eligible students who have participated in the preparation of
such documents.
D. To prepare briefs, abstracts and other documents filed in courts
of review of the State and to present oral arguments to such courts.
(i)
All documents filed shall be signed by, and filed in the name of,
the supervising member of the Bar and may also set forth
the names of eligible students participating in their preparation.
(ii)
Oral arguments may be presented by eligible students only in
the presence of the supervising member of the Bar.
4. Proviso:
Nothing herein contained shall limit or affect research, investigation
or related activities by law students or other persons who are not members
of the Illinois Bar but who, independently of this rule, could properly engage in such activities.

